**Executive Summary**

Nearly 1.2 billion people live in fragile states, including one-third of the world’s poor. Fragile states are vulnerable to internal and external shocks, including armed conflict. Of the world’s thirty-seven ongoing armed conflicts in 2011, more than twenty were in fragile states. Challenges emerging from fragile states, such as transnational threats, regional spillovers, and local insecurity and under-development require the attention of multilateral institutions.

More recently, cities have emerged as a new category of fragility in the security and development landscape. With unprecedentedly fast urbanization rates, cities are becoming the focal point of global poverty, conflict, and vulnerability to disasters—particularly when situated within a fragile state. Urban fragility can be seen as the extent to which urban systems are susceptible to damage incurred by shocks, with urban systems including not only infrastructure and ecological systems but also social, economic, and political systems.

Although no internationally agreed upon definition of fragile states exists, limited institutional capacity and weak governance are evident as main factors of fragility. While the early concept of fragility was dominated by security preoccupations, recent research on causes of civil war and intrastate armed conflict highlights the importance of weak institutions as the key structural cause that—particularly in combination with political and economic exclusion—create the conditions for conflict and violence. Despite its limitations, the concept of fragility has enhanced the linkage not just among international, national, and human security, but also among security, development, and governance needs, including issues of food, water, health, and environment.

Two new trends in “fragility” are emerging. First, although fragile states are often seen as a relatively narrow set of low-income, mainly sub-Saharan African, countries affected by conflict, a new understanding of fragility goes beyond fragile states, opting for the concept “states of fragility,” which assesses fragility as an issue of universal character that can affect all countries. Second, there is a new appetite among donors to start grappling with some of the broader dynamics of fragility going beyond the nature and boundaries of states, whether it is urban violence, the links between criminality and development, violent extremism, or other societal dynamics. At the same time, there is a growing recognition that fragile states are not only the result of endogenous “incapacities,” but, as part of the international system, they are also subject to pressures from external factors, such as global economic downturns or climate change, which also determine their relative fragility or resilience.

The international response to fragile states affected by conflict remains peacekeeping. UN humanitarian agencies also address fragility; however, the UN’s impact varies widely, with greater impact in smaller and poorer countries. When it comes to development, the UN is disproportionately concentrated in postconflict fragile states. Remittances have been consistently the largest source of external finance to fragile states, followed by Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). However, these financial flows are very unequally distributed. Regional development banks are another source of initiatives to strengthen fragile states.
When it comes to the response to fragile cities, it is hard to summarize the many initiatives at municipal level. UN-HABITAT remains at the forefront of the multilateral system’s responses to urban fragility. The nonprofit sector, both think tanks and civil society organizations, have contributed greatly, not only to a better understanding of the dynamics of urban fragility but also with projects aimed to engage local communities in urban violence reduction, humanitarianism, and development.

Yet important shortcomings persist in the United Nations and the multilateral system at large to make it fit for the purpose of addressing fragility and building resilience in both fragile states and cities. These gaps are conceptual and analytical; institutional; financial; engagement-related; and gender and youth-related. The following recommendations seek to address these gaps and make the system fit for improved responses to fragility:

1) Go beyond labeling countries as “fragile” and focus on a “3Rs” approach of risk assessment, resilience building, and robust processes.

2) Review the UN’s multiple peace and security institutions, mandates, funds, missions, and offices, in a holistic manner with an eye toward simplification and mergers.

3) Develop “Glocal Compacts” with multi-stakeholder strategies and pooled fund mechanisms.

4) Launch the annual Global Mayors Forum at the time of the opening of the General Assembly in New York to allow mayors to interact with national leaders at the global level.

5) The views and perspectives of women and youth should be sought out and systematically integrated into system wide responses to fragility.
Why Fragility Matters

Fragile States

Nearly 1.2 billion people live in fragile states, including one-third of the world’s poor. The proportion of young people is approximately twice that of non-fragile countries, and the populations in fragile states are growing roughly twice as fast. The 2011 World Development Report indicated that states experiencing or recovering from fragility and conflict account for 70 percent of infant deaths, 65 percent of people without access to safe water, and 77 percent of children missing from primary school. Fragile countries will achieve very few of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the end of the year, and they will remain the most challenging targets for the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals.

Fragile states are also more vulnerable to internal and external shocks—including armed conflict—and they can provide fertile ground for transnational threats to grow. Of the world’s thirty-seven ongoing armed conflicts in 2011, more than twenty were in fragile states, with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen having the most civilian casualties. Moreover, in today’s highly interconnected world, pressures on one fragile nation can have serious repercussions not only for that state and its people but also for its regional neighbors and beyond. The negative ripple effects of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, the humanitarian crisis in Syria, and the terrorist spillover from countries such as Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Somalia, are only a few recent reminders of the threats posed by fragile states.

Therefore, at least three sets of challenges emerging from fragile states require the attention of multilateral institutions:

1) Transnational threats. Corruption, economic distress, weak rule of law, poor security, and lack of capacity—all features of fragility—provide enabling conditions for transnational threats, such as international terrorism, transnational organized crime, global pandemics, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and uncontrolled migration, to name a few. The growing presence of global terrorist networks in Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia, Libya, or Yemen, as well as transnational criminal actors in West Africa are recent reminders of the kind of transnational challenges fragile states can pose. Still, the link between fragility and transnational threats is

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2 In 2007, Paul Collier made the argument that the key challenge of development is the small group of countries at the bottom of the development spectrum. These countries, and the billion people who live in them, are caught in one or another of four traps: the conflict trap; the natural resources trap; the trap of being landlocked with bad neighbors; and the trap of bad governance. See Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007).
more complicated and contingent than generally acknowledged.\textsuperscript{4} For example, criminal networks not only benefit from fragility but often deepen it, creating a parasitic dynamic with state institutions. On the other hand, the connection between state fragility and weapons of mass destruction is more limited than often presumed, with North Korea and Pakistan being the two glaring exceptions.

2) \textbf{Regional spillovers.} The regional implications of state fragility can be immense with neighboring countries suffering from additional instability and conflict, spillovers of humanitarian disasters, and years of lost economic growth. Unchecked crises that cannot be solved at a national level due to lack of capacity, or willingness, in the local governments, very often get on the multilateral agenda when they have already spilled over. The multilateral system ends up with the task of addressing more intractable challenges with much higher political, financial, and human costs. Intrastate conflicts that become regionalized are much harder to be solved. The humanitarian crisis in Syria has left the neighboring countries to absorb the vast majority of the more than 4 million refugees. The return of armed violence in Central African Republic in 2013 has left more than 500,000 people displaced, with 250,000 seeking refuge in fragile neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{5} Due to the most recent Ebola pandemics, knock-on effects on economies have been devastating in West Africa, with Sierra Leone, for example, losing 3.3 percentage points of GDP by the end of 2015.\textsuperscript{6}

3) \textbf{Local insecurity and under-development.} The burden of fragility falls hardest, of course, on the people living in weak states, which are home to the vast majority of the poorest “bottom billion” of humanity. Six countries are unlikely to meet any MDG by the end of the year: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, and South Sudan, in addition to the partially recognized Republic of Kosovo. With the exception of Papua New Guinea, these are all fragile. Inhabitants of fragile states are particularly exposed to violence, both from conflict and crime. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to external shocks. For example, they experience more violent food protests during food price spikes.\textsuperscript{7} External shocks can also disrupt institutional transformation, as was the case in Haiti after the devastating earthquake of early 2010.

\textit{Fragile Cities}

More recently, cities have emerged as a new category of fragility in the security and development landscape. More than half of humanity lives in cities today. In 2050, this number is projected to rise to nearly three-quarters, with the size of urban populations tripling and doubling in Asia and Africa

\textsuperscript{4} For a full analysis of these links, see Stewart M. Patrick, \textit{Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

\textsuperscript{5} Data from UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.


\textsuperscript{7} World Bank, 2011 \textit{World Development Report}, p. 103.
respectively.\textsuperscript{8} The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) estimates that, if current trends continue, the slum population will reach 1.4 billion by 2020.\textsuperscript{9}

Urban centers are reshaping interaction within the closest communities and across the globe. They create new opportunities but also pose new challenges. With unprecedentedly fast urbanization rates, cities are becoming the focal point of global poverty, conflict, and vulnerability to disasters—particularly when situated within a fragile state. Some observers identified cities “as a new frontier for international humanitarian action,” both in traditional conflict contexts and in “non-war situations.”\textsuperscript{10} As the United Nations High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda points out, “cities are where the battle for sustainable development will be won or lost.”\textsuperscript{11}

Fragile cities are also emerging as new epicenters of insecurity. For some analysts, cities are becoming new frontiers of warfare and insurgency.\textsuperscript{12} For others, the focus is on the staggering homicide rates of certain cities, linked to drug trafficking, organized crime, and gang wars. These are mainly located in Latin America, which hosts 43 of the 50 most violent cities in the world, while Karachi, Pakistan’s financial hub, was registered in 2013 as the world’s most dangerous megacity.\textsuperscript{13}

Although fragile cities appear to be in a separate category, some scholars also point toward continuity between state and urban fragility.\textsuperscript{14} On the one hand, some suggest that cities can strengthen fragile states, owing to their comparative advantages in hosting local elections, managing revenue generation, providing service delivery, mediating conflicts, and offering elite-driven bargaining.\textsuperscript{15} Yet others fear that so-called “feral cities” are the new frontier of insecurity, as urban environments in which a government “has lost the ability to maintain the rule of law within the city’s boundaries yet remains a functioning actor in the greater international system.”\textsuperscript{16} At the same time, in countries where the state is highly

\textsuperscript{9} UN-Habitat, State of World’s Cities 2006/7 (Nairobi: UN Habitat, 2006), p. vii.
\textsuperscript{15} Seth Kaplan, “Can Cities Change the Politics of Fragile States?” Global Dashboard (blog), December 15, 2013.
centralized and appears resilient, the absence of local empowerment and agency can, in reality, make the state fragile to local shocks and unrest.

What is Fragility? Definitions and Measurements

State Fragility
No internationally agreed upon definition of fragile states exists. The concept has been evolving throughout the last two decades through research and practice with added factors and levels of analysis, becoming an all-encompassing and hyper-aggregated concept, which is both politically problematic and analytically unhelpful. Still, if one looks at the different definitions available, limited institutional capacity and weak governance are evident as main factors of fragility.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Box 1. Examples of definitions of fragile states</th>
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| Fragility as a “risk inherent in the development process itself” that comes about “when [pressures] become too great for national institutions and political processes to manage.”  
  
  *African Development Bank, High Level Panel on Fragile States, 2014* |
| Fragility as “a state’s failure to perform its function effectively and to provide basic social services, such as health, education, security; incapacity to uphold the rule of law; and failure to provide sustainable sources of income for the population to get out of poverty.”  
  
  *Asian Development Bank, “Fragility Index for a Differentiated Approach,” 2014* |
| “A fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters. More resilient states exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and its territory. They can manage and adapt to changing social needs and expectations, shifts in elite and other political agreements, and growing institutional complexity. Fragility and resilience should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum.”  
  
  *OECD, “Fragile States 2013: Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World,” p. 15* |
| Fragile states are “those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. The most important functions of the state for poverty reduction are territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves.”  
  
  *UK Department for International Development, “Global Issues: Fragile States,” 2010* |
| “Some of the most common attributes of state fragility may include: 1) The loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; 2) The erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; 3) An inability to provide reasonable public services; 4) The inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.”  
  
Those states that “lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home or abroad.”

*Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, “Fragile States: Monitoring and Assessment, The Way Forward,” 2006*

The concept of failed states came to prominence in the early 1990s, with the collapse of Somalia as a functioning state. The attacks of September 11, 2001, lent renewed attention to those states with limited capacity to control their territories and which could become safe havens for terrorist networks, with Afghanistan being at the center of US concerns. While the early concept of fragility was dominated by security preoccupations, today there is a more all-encompassing idea of fragile states. This reflects recent research on causes of civil war and intrastate armed conflict, which highlights the importance of weak institutions as the key structural cause that—particularly in combination with political and economic exclusion—create the conditions for conflict and violence.17

A plethora of indices have been developed to measure the factors of fragility in states. These indices generally produce lists of countries organized in a hierarchy according to their performance against certain dimensions. Despite indices using different methodologies and indicators, the emerging lists of countries tend to be very similar. However, indexes are often criticized for being somewhat arbitrary in drawing “the line between performing and non-performing institutions, and for inconsistencies within and between them.”18 Also, the aggregate scores of these indices do not adequately illustrate in what particular state function these countries are fragile. “The consequence of such agglomeration of diverse criteria is to throw a monolithic cloak over disparate problems that require tailored solutions.”19

The most popular index of state fragility is the Fund for Peace’s “Fragile States Index” (formerly the “Failed States Index”), which uses forty-one indicators, grouped in twelve categories, ranging from demographic stresses to human rights violations and extreme poverty.20 Carlton University’s “Failed and Fragile States Index” uses seventy-five indicators of state fragility, grouped into six categories, including governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, and environment.21 The

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20 The categories of indicators include demographic pressures, refugees and internally displaced persons, group grievance, human flights and brain drain, uneven economic development, poverty and economic decline, state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized elites, and external interventions. See, the Fund for Peace website, available at http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicators .
Center for Systemic Peace’s “State Fragility Index and Matrix” measures fourteen security, political, economic, and social dimensions for both state effectiveness and legitimacy. In 2008, the Brookings Institution published the report “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World,” using twenty different indicators grouped in four categories: political, economic, security, and social welfare.

Individual researchers also contributed to the understanding and definition of fragility, coming from different disciplinary angles. For example, Robert Rotberg at Harvard University used a broad set of economic, political, and security indicators, and he distinguished among three categories of fragile states: collapsed, failed, and weak. A different set of factors was devised by the “Black Swan” theorist Nassim Nicholas Taleb: “a centralized governing system, an undiversified economy, excessive debt and leverage, a lack of political variability, and no history of surviving past shocks.” And, Ashraf Ghani, the current president of Afghanistan, with Clare Lockhart of the Institute for State Effectiveness, developed a quantitative framework to assess the ten core functions that states should perform. The indicators focused especially on the economic components of state function, including market regulation and the management of public finances.

Governments and multilateral organizations also ventured into identifying fragile states, although their thinking has evolved substantially through the years. Some donors produced lists of fragile states for a few years and eventually discontinued the exercise. The World Bank, for example, started with the Low Income Countries Under Stress Initiative (LICUS) in 2001, which eventually merged into the bank’s Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group, when it publicly disclosed the scores of its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) for the first time in 2006. The CPIA consists of sixteen criteria grouped in four equally weighted clusters, with a strong emphasis on economic and financial management. Today, the World Bank publishes a “Harmonized List of Fragile Situations,” which corresponds to the bottom CPIA scores.

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26 The ten core functions of state sovereignty are: (1) legitimate monopoly on the means of violence; (2) administrative control; (3) management of public finances; (4) investment in human capital; (5) delineation of citizenship rights and duties; (6) provision of infrastructure services; (7) formation of the market; (8) management of the state’s assets; (9) international relations; and (10) the rule of law. See Ashraf Ghani et al., “Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building,” London: Overseas Development Institute, 2005.
27 The World Bank’s four clusters of criteria are: (1) economic management; (2) structural policies; (3) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (4) public sector management and institutions. See World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) website, “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment,” available at http://bit.ly/1WWgDtP.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) began reporting on official
development assistance flows specifically to a group of conflict-affected and fragile states in 2005 based
on an annually revised composite list drawn from the World Bank’s lists harmonized with those of the
African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank, and the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index.
Most recently however, the OECD has shifted its analytical framework away from the category of
“fragile states” to “states of fragility,” which is analyzed more closely below.

The African Development Bank’s High-Level Panel on Fragile States focused on the roots of fragility,
which can be national, regional, or global, while recommending that assistance to African countries must
take into account the different levels of fragility. In other words, it argues for an approach that sees
fragility not as “a category of states, but as a risk inherent in the development processes itself.”
The Asian Development Bank developed a Fragility Index, which includes four traditional areas of fragility:
economic, state, conflict and justice, and security and peace. More interestingly, the Asian Development
Bank also added to its index two exogenous dimensions: environmental sustainability and world risk in
terms of natural threats.

Large bilateral donor agencies, such as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development
(DFID) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), produced both analysis and strategies
on state fragility but stopped short of ranking countries for obvious political sensitivities. USAID, for
example, proposed thirty-three indicators of state effectiveness and legitimacy in four governance
areas: economic, political, security, and social spheres. DFID published a proxy list of fragile states,
using the World Bank’s CPIA scores, together with policy recommendations to improve the effectiveness
of aid in fragile states. Still, these documents are quite dated and do not prominently feature on the
agencies’ websites anymore. The thinking has clearly moved on.

A new multilateral initiative has been underway since 2011, called the New Deal, which has brought
underdevelopment and the lack of rule of law to the forefront of measuring fragility. The New Deal was
agreed in Busan, South Korea, at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness by donors and
self-identified fragile countries that have organized themselves into a grouping called the g7+.
It sought to place the fragile countries themselves in the driving seat when it comes to determining the

29 Asian Development Bank, “Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations: Fragility Index for a
32 The g7+ is a voluntary association of countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are now in
transition to the next stage of development. Currently, it includes twenty members: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
Liberia, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan,
Timor-Leste, Togo, and Yemen.
causes of their fragility, setting their own priorities, and planning their own paths to resilience. Despite this agreement, there has been mixed progress on the ground.\textsuperscript{33}

Finally, there is also a growing awareness that fragility affects middle income or non-conflict-affected countries as well. As mentioned previously, this is best reflected in the latest OECD report on fragility that differs markedly from previous editions as it seeks to present a new understanding of fragility beyond fragile states, instead opting for the concept “states of fragility.”\textsuperscript{34} It assesses fragility as an issue of universal character that can affect all countries. Its group of countries most challenged differs little from the traditional list of fragile states. Still, several middle-income countries with disproportionately high levels of crime-related violence, subnational conflict, or poor access to justice move into the spotlight.\textsuperscript{35}

Two new trends in “fragility” are, therefore, emerging. First, while the rise of the g7+ and the New Deal has led fragile states to be seen as a relatively narrow set of low-income, mainly sub-Saharan African, countries affected by conflict, fragility is today more often seen as a “state” that can affect all countries, manifesting itself in different ways in different contexts. Second, there is a new appetite among donors to start grappling with some of the broader dynamics of fragility going beyond the nature and boundaries of states, whether it is urban violence, the links between criminality and development, violent extremism, or other societal dynamics. At the same time, there is a growing recognition that fragile states are not only the result of endogenous “incapacities,” but, as part of the international system, they are also subject to pressures from external factors, such as global economic downturns or climate change, which also determine their relative fragility or resilience. The universality of the post-2015 development agenda, with goals ranging from development to security and governance, will be a new entry point to start thinking about fragility and resilience in this more holistic way.

**Urban Fragility**

The concept of fragile cities is relatively new, and much less effort has gone into developing an understanding of them. No rankings exist and definitions are sparse. The scholar Robert Muggah defines fragile cities as “discrete metropolitan units whose governance arrangements exhibit a declining ability and/or willingness to deliver on the social contract.”\textsuperscript{36} More generally, urban fragility can be seen as the extent to which the urban systems are susceptible to damage incurred by shocks, with urban systems including not only infrastructure and ecological systems but also social, economic, and political systems. While some shocks, such as floods, can affect whole metropolitan areas, regardless of the affluence of its inhabitants, others, such as criminal violence or lack of public services, may impact more the poor

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\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, p. 15.

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and disadvantaged populations. Security, development, and governance capacity may not be uniformly distributed across urban areas. There is, therefore, a spatial dimension of urban fragility, as socioeconomic and political conditions determine the degree of fragility that each urban dweller experiences.

This hardly new phenomenon has been called “dual or divided cities,” where income inequality and the unequal distribution of economic opportunities across groups become key drivers of fragility. This social and spatial segregation leads to the erosion of formal urban governance, the breakdown of the “social contract” between the public authorities and the disadvantaged citizens that increases the likeliness of criminal violence and social unrest.37

New evidence also suggests that the pace of urban population growth is an indicator of fragility, more than the actual size of a city. “It took New York approximately 150 years to grow to 8 million people, while Mexico and Sao Paulo generated the same interval of population growth in less than 15 years.”38 This unprecedented pace of urbanization has stressed urban institutions in many developing countries to their breaking point.

Population density has also been singled out as factor that influences the level of crime and can affect the capacity of urban institutions to provide services. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has noted that in the Americas, including the United States, density and homicide are strongly correlated. But it also noted that “other factors may nonetheless result in unexpectedly high homicide rates in certain less densely populated areas,” such as criminal activities in border cities or targeted police operations.39 At the same time, low levels of population density can make the provision of public services, such as transportation, sanitation, and electrification, costly or unfeasible.

The correlation between youth bulges, high levels of unemployment, and violence has also been identified as a factor of fragility.40 While the average age of city dwellers in Berlin, Rome, and Vienna is 45, “the mean age of urban residents in Bamako, Kabul, Kampala, and Mogadishu, to name just a few, hovers at around 16.”41

If what causes fragility in cities is still debated, then even less is known about resilience in an urban context. “The manner in which informal institutions in supposedly chronically violent cities such as Beirut, Medellin, or Johannesburg are capable of reproducing alternative service functions is poorly understood.” A useful framework of reference has been developed by the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities project, which suggested four dimensions and twelve drivers of urban resilience. These include: (1) Basic needs; (2) Livelihood and Employment; (3) Public Health Service; (4) Cohesive and Engaged Communities; (5) Social Stability, Security and Justice; (6) Economic Prosperity; (7) Protective Natural and Man-Made Assets; (8) Continuity of Critical Services; (9) Reliable Communication and Mobility; (10) Leadership and Effective Management; (11) Empowerment of Broad Range of Stakeholders; and (12) Long-term and Integrated Planning.

A Note on Resilience
Resilience is a complex concept that originated in system theory and has a variety of interpretations and applications. A broadly accepted definition describes resilience as “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks.”

In the humanitarian field, resilience has been used to identify the capacity of a system to absorb a shock (i.e., a natural or man-made disaster) and bounce back to its original state, focusing on the first part of the above definition. However, when it comes to social-ecological systems, as states and cities are, resilience is a less linear notion. Bouncing back to the original status might not be welcome in certain circumstances, for example when a civil war has unraveled a dictatorial regime. The emphasis has, therefore, shifted to the second part of the definition, namely, the capacity of a system “to reorganize while undergoing change.” The concept of resilience has started to encompass notions of adaptation, learning, and self-organization in addition to the capacity to absorb shocks.

This idea of resilience has become part of the discourse on fragile states and cities. In fact, resilience is increasingly seen as the desired outcome of a transition out of fragility. The reluctance of some countries to adopt the label “fragile states,” and their preference to stress the more positive dynamics of moving toward resilience has put the concept even more on center stage.

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Rahul Chandran offered a working definition of resilience, “a feature of states and more precisely social contracts,” that helps to focus policy intervention in fragile contexts on the ability to cope with changes in three areas: capacity, effectiveness, and legitimacy. “These changes can be driven by shocks—sudden changes—or through long-term erosions (or increases) in capacity, effectiveness or legitimacy.”48 The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report prescribed the successful path to move away from fragility and violence to resilience: “[B]y mobilizing coalitions in support of citizen security, justice, and jobs to restore confidence in the short term and by transforming national institutions over time.”49 The African Development Bank put “building resilience” at the core of its Group Strategy 2014–2019.50

In this context, it is worth mentioning that the concept of resilience has its own detractors. Some criticized the idea that it represents the opposite of fragility. For example, Nassim Nicholas Taleb coined a new word, “antifragile,” claiming it better describes the ability to improve with stress rather than merely resist it as the resilience implies.51 Resilience might also set the bar too low, as also authoritarian regimes can be resilient. On the other hand, resilience risks becoming yet another undefined demand posed on already weak states by external donors. In other words, “on top of having to be effective, legitimate, transparent and accountable, fragile states will now also have to become resilient.”52 Moreover, resilience carries the same risk of fragility, both emphasizing governance and state institutions, ignoring sources of resilience that reside outside the state. Finally, as for fragility, resilience is an aggregated concept that does not answer the questions of whose resilience and to be resilient to what.

**Responses to Fragility**

Despite its limitations, the concept of fragility has enhanced the linkage not just among international, national, and human security, but also among security, development, and governance needs, including issues of food, water, health, and environment.53 At the bilateral level, the “whole of government” or “3Ds” approaches, whereby development, diplomatic, and defense ministries are brought together to integrate or harmonize their work, reflect the recognition of these linkages in fragile states.54 The main

52 Frauke de Weijer, “Resilience,” p. 15.
policy implication has been the development of specific approaches, such as the OECD’s Governance for Development and Peace (G4DP), the World Bank Group Assistance to Low-Income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, and the aforementioned New Deal. In addition, those organizations that did not establish ad-hoc units have adopted specific frameworks for fragile countries. This compartmentalization has emphasized the idea of fragile states as a separate category of countries with special needs, rather than the new approach, promoted by the OECD, that sees fragility as an issue of universal character that can affect all countries.

The preferred international response to fragile states affected by conflict remains peacekeeping, with an emphasis on security sector reform and rule-of-law initiatives. The UN is by an order of magnitude the main provider of peacekeepers, while, despite rhetorical attention and current increases, regional organizations lag behind. Newer integrated tools emerged in the UN to address the multifaceted challenges of fragile countries, such as the multidimensional peace operations (e.g., UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali [MINUSMA]) and the integrated peacebuilding missions (e.g., UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone [UNIPSIL], which drew down in 2014), whose mandates generally include strengthening governance, but the geographical scope of their agenda remains limited to a few postconflict countries.

When it comes to development, the UN presence in fragile states is very broad and predates the use of this label. However, the UN is disproportionately concentrated in postconflict fragile states, spending more than $6 billion in development and humanitarian assistance in twenty-five fragile states in 2011, double what it spent in all low-income states that were not affected by conflict. In these twenty-five countries, UN development agencies had more than 25,000 staff, more than it had in the rest of the world (excluding headquarters staff).\footnote{55}

UN humanitarian agencies also address fragility. The 1990s and the 2000s have seen steady increase in both the absolute volume of spending through the UN humanitarian agencies and of their percentage share of humanitarian spending. Because these agencies form part of the broader UN development family (UN Development Group Office [UNDGO], now the UN Development Operations Coordination Office [UNDOCO]), they provide the UN an important additional window into fragility and a platform for engagement.

However, the UN’s impact varies widely. As a rule of thumb, it can be said that its impact is greater in smaller and poorer countries, i.e., greater impact in Sierra Leone and Nepal than in Pakistan. That should not come as a surprise, since larger and relatively well-resourced countries can shield their sovereignty from multilateral interventions, “no matter how hollow the de facto sovereignty inside the state’s borders.”\footnote{56} This trend highlights a challenge when it comes to developing mechanisms for assistance in


\footnote{56} Ibid., p. 3.
lower-middle-income countries, which still remain fragile, such as Nigeria or Pakistan. Country size also matters, given the limited financial resources that the UN is able to mobilize.

Remittances have been consistently the largest source of external finance to fragile states, followed by Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). However, these financial flows are very unequally distributed. In 2012, most FDI went to just six resource-rich countries for investment in the extractive industries (Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Iraq, Nigeria, and Sudan), while 50 percent of the remittances went to Nigeria, Egypt, and Bangladesh. Fragile countries often rely on a narrow base of state revenues, such as non-renewable natural resources and customs revenues. The tax base and resource mobilization capacity are often low in the poorest and most fragile situations. ODA, therefore, fills an important gap in financing fragile countries. Still, aggregate data hide the imbalances in allocation of aid. Of countries where aid activity is missing, which are those that the OECD calls “aid orphans,” ten out of eleven have been on the fragile state list. Even two of the countries most heavily affected by the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Guinea and Sierra Leone, are aid orphans.

Regional development banks are another source of initiatives to strengthen the “immune system” of fragile states. As mentioned above, the African Development Bank has developed specific strategies to address fragility in Africa. In 2008, it created an operationally autonomous entity within the Bank—the Fragile States Facility—to provide eligible fragile states with grants to support their postconflict reconstruction, clear arrears of eligible countries, and provide technical assistance and capacity-building support. So far, it has disbursed more than $500 million to seventeen countries it has identified as fragile. Similarly, the Asian Development Bank has acknowledged the importance of staying engaged in fragile and conflict-affected situations, stressing the need to tailor modes of engagement to the specific needs of affected countries. It developed in 2013 an “Operational Plan for Enhancing Effectiveness in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations” based on lessons learned since 2007. The overall Asian Development Bank assistance (combined loans, grants, and technical assistance) to fragile countries amounted to $2.54 billion during 2007–2011. It remains to be seen what approach, if any, new regional banks, such as the BRICS’ New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, will take when it comes to fragile states.

When it comes to fragile cities, it is hard to summarize the many initiatives at municipal level. UN-HABITAT remains at the forefront of the multilateral system’s responses to urban fragility, with its program to increase the resilience of cities to the impacts of natural and man-made crises and the Global Network on Safer Cities, to name two key initiatives. The International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UN Refugee Agency, and the UN

Development Programme all have developed initiatives that target fragility at the urban level in recent years. Many bilateral donors, among them DFID, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and USAID, have started to fund urban projects, mainly focusing on violence prevention and reduction but also on building resilience and capacity in municipal administrations.

The nonprofit sector, both think tanks and civil society organizations, have contributed greatly, not only to a better understanding of the dynamics of urban fragility but also with projects aimed to engage local communities in urban violence reduction, humanitarianism, and development. To cite a few cases, the HASOW project focused on the dynamics of violence in Latin American and Caribbean cities, including Ciudad Juárez, Medellín, Port-au-Prince, and Rio de Janeiro. The Graduate Institute in Geneva produced a toolkit with practical recommendations on how to build urban resilience in situations of chronic violence, in collaboration with USAID and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.\(^1\) The International Development Research Centre, with UK’s DFID, has sponsored Safe and Inclusive Cities (SAIC), a global research program that documents the links between urban violence, poverty, and inequalities, while the London School of Economics initiative, Cities and Fragile States, focused on how cities in fragile states—as social, economic, political, and spatial entities—can promote or prevent the unraveling of the state.

**Current Gaps in Multilateral Responses**

As discussed in the previous pages, important shortcomings persist in the multilateral system to make it fit for the purpose of addressing fragility and building resilience in both fragile states and cities. The following section summarizes the main gaps that deserve attention for reform. These gaps are: (1) conceptual and analytical; (2) institutional; (3) financial; (4) engagement-related; and (5) gender and youth-related.

**1. Conceptual and analytical gap**

The conceptual and analytical gap includes at least four shortcomings, which equally apply to state and city fragility:

- **Inadequacy of the “fragility” concept.** Despite its evolution, the notion of fragility is too broad to be analytically useful. It is a “hyper-aggregate” concept that hides the very complexity of the challenges that these states and cities have to face.\(^2\) Fragility indices include states that are recovering from

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\(^2\) Some have criticized the “hyper-aggregation” of fragility indices and proposed alternatives to disaggregate the concept. For example, Charles Call suggested focusing on three gaps: security, capacity, and legitimacy (See, Charles Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State’: Toward Conceptual Alternatives,” *European Journal of International Relations* 17, No. 2 (2010): 303–326). Bruce Jones and Rahul Chandran suggested capacity, effectiveness, and legitimacy (See, Jones and Chandran, “From Fragility to Resilience,” p. 17). These alternatives still leave open the question of how to define these gaps across different countries and systems.
conflict, such as Liberia and Timor-Leste, countries that are experiencing long-term insecurities, recurrent violence outbreaks, or localized conflict, such as the Central African Republic, or high levels of criminality and violence, such as Haiti and Pakistan. Secondly, although there is a growing awareness that fragility afflicts not only postconflict and poor countries, much of the focus remains on the latter, and little has been done to understand fragility in middle- and high-income contexts. Finally, ranking states according to various indicators of fragility is also a politically problematic process, donor-driven and Western-biased, and unhelpful in generating solutions, particularly in those countries “unwilling” to carry out policy change.  

• **Technocratic approaches.** The use of generic labels also encourages cookie-cutter approaches and technical solutions to what generally are highly contextualized political problems. Since communities have agency and are not passive players in the face of fragility, their specific interests and preferences need to be taken into consideration. Certain domestic constituencies, for example, might have interest in perpetuating fragility in institutions. These are political dynamics not captured by any of the current fragility indices.  

• **Lip-service to resilience.** Although the concept of resilience is now part of the discourse on fragile states and cities, very little is known about what makes institutions and societies resilient and to what shocks and risks. Thinking in terms of resilience requires a mental shift that has not happened in multilateral institutions. Specifically, this requires a focus on change and adaptation, rather than on stability and stabilization, with an acknowledgement that change is inherently unpredictable. The donors’ favored narrative that assisting a country means to support its transition from fragile to resilient in a liner way over an agreed timeframe is not realistic. Better understanding of these erratic trajectories is needed.  

• **Lack of micro-data and use of local knowledge.** Much effort goes into tracking national indicators of fragility. However, the lower level of analysis remains under-quantified. New technology, in particular data mining and analysis of different data streams at city and community levels can tell much about societal preferences and dynamics. In addition, regional, national, and community-level knowledge have not found effective channels to influence and inform the international decision-making process. “Local perceptions tend to be incorporated in situation analysis and early warning as background information but tend not to be directly leveraged” for policy assistance in fragile contexts.  

2. **Institutional gap**

Two shortcomings can be identified within the institutional gap:

• **Compartmentalized silos.** Fragile states show that risk factors are interconnected and often beyond their national control. Still, the multilateral system is organized in compartmentalized institutional silos, purporting to separate security, development, human rights, humanitarian assistance,  

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63 Stewart Patrick, for example, usefully singled out the differences between states unable and those unwilling to carry out tasks. See S. Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction,” *Washington Quarterly* 29, No. 2 (2006): 27–53.  

environmental management, and other issues. These silos are poorly coordinated and often work at cross-purposes, mostly focusing on country programs and rarely developing regional initiatives. The UN tools for joint programs and integration are overly complex, process-oriented, and generally perceived as a bureaucratic exercise with little impact on the situation on the ground. Meanwhile, the multilateral system continues in the practice of establishing a new office to match emerging challenges. Establishing separate units that deal with fragile states represent yet another failure to learn the lesson of integrated challenges.

- **Missing urban dimension.** While fragility is clearly no longer confined exclusively to nation states but rather penetrates their capitals, metropolitan regions, and urban areas, the multilateral system is still geared toward engagement with centralized state authority, with a bias toward rural areas when it comes to development aid. Since the multilateral system is inherently state-based, the challenge for fragile cities is that they are viewed as an inherently state-centric phenomenon. Rather than being treated as a separate category and challenge in and of itself, urban fragility is largely treated by the current multilateral system as a subset of the “fragile state” phenomenon.

### 3. Financial Gap

- The projections for economic growth and aid are not promising in fragile states in the coming years. Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) are also very limited, due to lack of transparency, infrastructure, and business opportunities. While there is a growing attention to taxation as a potential source of development finance, domestic revenue mobilization is far from being achieved. The result is that aid flows to fragile states tend to be highly volatile—according to one study, twice as volatile as aid to stable countries. The 2011 *World Development Report* found that it is “not uncommon for total aid to Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Haiti to drop by 20 or 30 percent in one year and increase by up to 50 percent the following year.” Rather than buttressing countries against their internal instability, aid flows often reinforce these effects. Aid volatility has been found to negatively affect recipients’ economic growth and to reduce levels of domestic investment.

### 4. Engagement Gap

There are at least two shortcomings related to the engagement gap:

- **Short-term goals.** Creating resilient and legitimate institutions is a generational endeavor. Even the fastest-transforming countries (e.g., Portugal and the Republic of Korea) have taken between fifteen...
and thirty years to raise their institutional performance to the level of a functioning state.\footnote{World Bank, 2011 World Development Report, p. 108.} Wishful thinking on timing pervades development assistance when it comes to capacity building in fragile contexts. In part, it derives from the donors’ desire to meet targets quickly. But goals are also very often set to focus on limiting the spread of transnational threats, such as reinforcing militarily an oppressive and delegitimized regime. Some short-term policies can inadvertently exacerbate state weakness and vulnerability.

- **Lack of local ownership.** Physical security may be imposed from outside, but sustainable order and governance capacities have to emerge and be maintained by local actors. Although the international community acknowledges that local agency is a pre-condition for building durable resilience in fragile states, multilateral assistance is still predominately driven by external priorities and donors’ timetables. On one hand, too much external intervention undermines the ability of a society to self-organize and it builds dependence. At the same time, most fragile societies lack expertise and institutional capacity to fully engage in self-assessment and even less capability in implementing any policy process.

5. **Gender and Youth Perspective Gap**

- Despite improvements in the last decade, the rhetorical calls for more gender perspectives and, more recently, youth perspectives to be integrated into international support to fragile contexts is still neglected in much of current statebuilding theory and practice. Fragility not only has spatial and socioeconomic dimensions, but it is also gendered. Very often, the question of who bears most of the fragility burden in a society is not asked, and solutions are not targeted to support the most vulnerable components of a society.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The following conclusion presents a series of recommendations along four priority areas, which aim to address the gaps in the multilateral system and fit the United Nations and multilateral system at large for improved responses to fragile states and cities. These four areas are: Concepts and Analysis; Institutions and Leadership; Financial Resources; and Compacts and Fora. Five concrete recommendations are at the heart of the conclusion:

6) Go beyond labeling countries as “fragile” and focus on a “3Rs” approach of risk assessment, resilience building, and robust processes.

7) Review the UN’s multiple peace and security institutions, mandates, funds, missions, and offices, in a holistic manner with an eye toward simplification and mergers.

8) Develop “Glocal Compacts” with multi-stakeholder strategies and pooled fund mechanisms.
9) Launch the annual Global Mayors Forum at the time of the opening of the General Assembly in New York to allow mayors to interact with national leaders at the global level.

10) The views and perspectives of women and youth should be sought out and systematically integrated into system wide responses to fragility.

1. Concepts and Analysis

Go Beyond Fragility. The multilateral institutions should fully embrace the idea that fragility is a state in which all countries can be, depending on different capacities and challenges that are not only endogenous but also triggered by regional and global dynamics. In particular, the practice of labeling and ranking countries or areas as “failed,” “fragile,” or “ungoverned,” according to some combinations of indicators, ought to be abandoned, and analytical resources should be invested in understanding the specificities of a case, including formal and informal institutional dynamics, societal preferences, and local capacities. Going beyond these labels has several advantages, including the avoidance of simplistic prescriptions and cookie-cutter approaches.

Focus on a “3Rs Approach” (Risks, Resilience, Robustness). Embracing resilience as a guiding concept means to view social systems as dynamic and to recognize that any societal transformation is inherently unpredictable and non-linear. More efforts are required to enhance the understanding of what constitutes risk factors in a country, what the distribution is (i.e., spatial, gender-based, or socioeconomic), and what builds resilience, capacity to adapt, and robust processes for planning and response. This approach should aim to shift international assistance from the design of tightly targeted programs to flexible plans that leave space for more interactive approaches with local actors, and it should also aim to create the conditions that foster self-organization and adaptive behavior.71

Develop micro-data analysis. Although much effort goes into tracking national indicators of fragility, the micro level of analysis is underestimated. The international community focuses too much on communalities, instead of highly tailored realities. More data are necessary at the city and community level. New technology must be leveraged in a more consistent way. Data mining and analysis of different data streams, including social media, images, texts, and geospatial location at the city and community level, can tell much about societal preferences. Multilateral institutions have not yet taken full notice of initiatives such as the UN Global Pulse, while the latter still operates disjointedly from main policymaking processes in UN headquarters and member states’ capitals. Organizations that have the largest capacity to collect data, such as the World Bank and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), should take the lead to develop micro-level indicators of risks and performance, and propose joint initiatives with technology foundations and companies.

Distribute analytical capacity more equally. Analytical and long-term planning capacity is not equally distributed in the multilateral system. Some institutions, such as the IFIs, have a stronger tradition of

producing solid research and data-driven analysis. Other bodies have very limited resources and staff for such exercises. The gap is particularly wide when it comes to knowledge of urban dynamics, which is currently concentrated in few multilateral organizations, with UN-HABITAT in the lead. This expertise needs to be scaled up and expanded across the system. The UN Secretariat, in particular, needs to develop more analytical capacity to understand the kind of risks that peace missions have to face. This capacity does not imply only more hiring but also enhanced information sharing within the multilateral system. For example, virtual epistemic communities can be created on the intranet, following the example of social media, pulling knowledge on resilience building from internal staff and external sources.

2. Institutions and Leadership

Review the institutional setting holistically. Review the UN’s multiple peace and security institutions, mandates, funds, missions, and offices in a holistic manner, rather than one by one, with an eye toward simplification and merger, and the goal of maximizing both the effectiveness and efficiency of the current institutional setting. Special attention should be given to “organizational models” for integration, such as the thematic Global Focal Points (see, for example, DPKO-UNDP’s Global Focal Point of Police, Justice, and Corrections), which could be, for example, organized around the new Sustainable Development Goals. Much of the work coming out of the reviews of UN peace operations and the peacebuilding architecture is consistent with this endeavor.

Create a “home” for monitoring long-term progress. Currently, the UN has no institutional home for monitoring long-term progress in institution-building and no systematic approach to highlighting gaps, trade-offs, and risks, in particular potential tensions between building peace and institutions. This could be a task for the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), although it would be limited to the countries on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda.

Simplify “Delivery As One” frameworks. Most of the UN efforts to operate as “one” are process-driven, with a plethora of new frameworks, documents, and budget tools that overburden staff and focus on the internal UN process, rather than delivering results. A thorough review of these processes should be undertaken with the goal of simplifying and reducing the number of documents and reports that UN country teams have to produce and replace them with internet-based project management tools that allow staff across agencies and departments to work together and report on the achieved results.

Improve field leadership selection processes. This is particularly important when it comes to resident

72 While peacebuilding and statebuilding can be mutually reinforcing, they can also undermine each other. Where external donors provide resources to corrupt central governments in the name of strengthening their institutions, then “capacity building” can fuel resentment and armed resistance. Where peace entails accepting deals that enshrine the power of military faction leaders, as in Liberia in 2003, enabling them to divide and capture state resources, peacebuilding can undermine statebuilding. See, Charles Call and Elizabeth Cousens, “Ending Wars and Building Peace,” New York: International Peace Institute, March 2007.
coordinators operating in postconflict contexts, where the traditional development background might not suffice. The emphasis should go on leadership on the ground that can develop a new UN approach to align peace agreements, national development, and peacebuilding priorities, because building resilience requires political engagement, and not only technical solutions, to make sure there is a societal buy-in and national/subnational accountability. A few pilot countries could be identified to roll out such a new UN approach.

3. Financial Resources

Develop new funding pool mechanisms. Donors should gear toward the use of financing mechanisms that encourage joint initiatives and cooperation among multilateral agencies and departments, rather than completion and fragmentation. Pool funding and “matching funds” should be available not only to governments but also foundations, companies, charities, and individuals. A good example of a pool mechanism is the Central Emergency Response Fund of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which supports rapid humanitarian response for people affected by natural disasters and armed conflict. A new fundraising drive to make resources available for preventive initiatives, rather than for reaction to emergencies only, should become a priority of the new UN secretary-general.

Create incentive for private investments. It is necessary to create incentives for private actors to invest in building resilience. For example, the “IFIs’ risk guarantees and equity investment instruments can attract FDI into jump-starting economic activity and jobs. Projects can be designed that harness natural resources revenues for institution-building and improving government legitimacy.”

Focus on fiscal constitutions. Fiscal policy is a major instrument to develop institutional capacity in states and cities, and sound fiscal constitutions can decrease inequality, allow for better governance, and help to develop a robust social contract. Since fragile states and cities have extremely weak fiscal constitutions and low domestic revenue mobilization, multilateral assistance should focus more on developing fiscal capacity in fragile contexts.

4. Compacts and Fora

Build “Glocal Compacts.” Multilateral strategies to build resilience should follow the principle of subsidiarity, by having multilateral institutions step in when local agency is not sufficient to provide support to local solutions. When support is needed, multilateral actors should build “glocal compacts,” which include global, regional, and local actors. In this way, the multilateral organizations become just one actor in a broader strategic partnership that should support risk assessments, develop long-term


74 As defined by the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, “glocal” means “having features or relating to factors that are both local and global.”
robust planning processes, and assist in delivering long-term efforts to build resilience. Stakeholders’ analysis could help to identify the appropriate role of each player, while South-South and triangular cooperation for institution and leadership building should be scaled up to help meet the needs.

**Launch the annual Global Mayors Forum.** Despite the existence of several international fora and networks of city mayors, there is no forum that connects municipal and national leadership at the global level. The UN should promote an annual Global Mayors Forum at the time of the annual opening of the General Assembly in New York. This forum can become an additional channel for information sharing, advocacy, and norm setting among cities. But, even more importantly, it would help to bring global attention to social urban dynamics and share lessons of municipal solutions to risk factors, such as violence, inequalities, corruptions, and environmental degradation.
Fragile States: Select Bibliography and Initiatives


Fragile Cities: Select Bibliography and Initiatives


